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IS EUROPE ‘GIVING IN TO BABY MARKETS?’​[1]​
REPRODUCTIVE TOURISM IN EUROPE AND THE GRADUAL EROSION OF EXISTING LEGAL LIMITS TO REPRODUCTIVE MARKETS




The main question in this article is how national legal orders in Europe, given their often restrictive laws on reproductive markets and assisted reproductive technologies, are currently responding and should respond to reproductive tourism, in light of the fact that access to foreign reproductive markets seems to be making these national laws ‘merely symbolic’. Although many national governments have finally managed after many years of political and legal struggles to establish a carefully balanced legal framework for the regulation of these often ethically and religiously sensitive matters, ironically reproductive travel seems to be turning national reproductive laws into a dead letter.

Currently, as a reaction to these developments, new legal strategies are being proposed and explored. Within the European context the view is gaining ground that laws that curb international reproductive markets and their accompanying streams of fertility tourism have become ineffective, meaningless and even harmful. As a result, a certain tendency towards tolerance of reproductive markets and reproductive travel can be detected in both politics and academia. According to this line of reasoning, restrictive and prohibitive legislation should be replaced by more pragmatic policies that take the realities of reproductive markets as a starting point. From this perspective, the legal restrictions within the country of origins, rather than the lack of regulation in the country of destination, should be regarded as the core of the problem. As a result, an increasing number of scholars and policy makers are arguing for more lenient national policies towards ARTs, hoping to thereby remove the main incentive for aspiring parents to resort to foreign reproductive services.










It is a well-known fact that national legal bans and restrictions on the use of assisted reproductive technologies (hereafter: ARTs) and services have not prevented citizens from gaining access to these technologies and services outside their own state. The internet has opened up international reproductive markets to prospective parents from all over the world, thereby enabling reproductive and consumer choice to bypass national ART legislation. Media reports suggest that in the ‘cyberprocreation era’​[2]​ all that is required to create a child is an internet connection and a credit card. Indeed, a simple Google search shows that, for instance, sperm from anonymous Danish donors, egg cells from anonymous Spanish donors and the services of an Indian surrogate mother are only a few clicks away. Moreover, the prices of these products and services depend not only on the social-economic situation within the country of destination, but often also on consumer preferences, such as the popularity of certain genetic, racial and other traits of the donor.​[3]​ 
These developments have given rise to what is most commonly known as reproductive or fertility tourism. For a number of years, professionals in the fertility field prefer the term ‘cross-border reproductive care’ (abbreviated as ‘CBRC’), as the label ‘tourism’ could have negative connotations.​[4]​ However, as this term has also been criticised as biased,​[5]​ the more conventional term of reproductive tourism will be used throughout this article. Although this type of medical tourism has been mentioned in academia since the beginning of the 1990s, and although the image of the fertility tourist in the meantime has become part of popular culture, as evidenced by the growing number of news items, documentaries, and even reality TV shows on the subject, national legal orders in Europe are still struggling to come to terms with the phenomenon. 

In many European countries restrictive and prohibitive regulation is in force, which aims to protect against possible risks of reproductive markets, such as exploitation of egg cell donors and surrogates, commodification of children or the anonymity of the genetic parents. Moreover, the principle of non-commercialisation, according to which ‘the human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain’​[6]​  has been firmly established within the European legal tradition.​[7]​ Nevertheless, even though many national European governments remain critical towards the growing commercialisation of human reproduction, the rise of reproductive tourism has made it clear that simply prohibiting reproductive markets is not the panacea. Instead, new regulatory dilemmas have emerged. 

The main problem is that reproductive travel has revealed that national authorities are in many ways powerless to regulate reproductive markets. In fact, the most common reason for European citizens to resort to transnational reproductive travel is evasion of domestic legal bans on reproductive services and technologies,​[8]​ such as commercial surrogacy, for-profit sale of human egg cells and sperm, gender selection, postmenopausal fertility treatments and anonymous egg cell and sperm donation, all of which are prohibited in many European countries. This type of reproductive travel is part of a broader phenomenon, which could be called ‘circumvention tourism’:​[9]​ travelling abroad to engage in activities or services which are prohibited in one’s home country, such as prostitution, abortion, soft drugs or female genital mutilation. 

Although European reproductive travellers have various motivations for crossing borders for fertility treatment,​[10]​ the general focus in this article will be on the most common type of reproductive tourism: circumventive reproductive tourism. The main question in this article is how national legal orders in Europe, given their often restrictive laws on reproductive markets and assisted reproductive technologies, are currently responding and should respond to circumventive reproductive tourism, in light of the fact that access to foreign reproductive markets seems to be making these restrictive laws ‘merely symbolic’. Although many national governments have finally managed after many years of political and legal struggles to establish a carefully balanced legal framework for the regulation of these often ethically and religiously sensitive matters, ironically reproductive travel seems to be turning national reproductive laws into a dead letter. 

Currently, as a reaction to these developments, new legal strategies are being proposed and explored. Although different approaches to reproductive tourism have been propagated, a certain tendency towards tolerance of both reproductive markets and reproductive travel can be detected in both politics and academia. At first sight, this tendency seems remarkable. Despite disagreement among states on the specific regulation and limits of reproductive markets, general consensus does exist that reproductive tourism has several negative consequences and side effects.​[11]​ After all, most policy makers and scholars advocate some form of regulation of reproductive markets, ranging from safety and health protocols for fertility treatments, to more ambitious general legal frameworks aimed at protecting human reproduction against commodification or commercialisation. When fertility treatments or reproductive services take place abroad, these safety guarantees and legal frameworks are no longer able to be controlled by the state of residence of the commissioning parents. Moreover, reproductive tourism can result in new social inequalities, especially when the country of destination is relatively poor.​[12]​ 

Nevertheless, within the European context the view is gaining ground that laws that curb international reproductive markets and their accompanying streams of fertility tourism have become ineffective, ‘meaningless’​[13]​ and even harmful. The emerging strategy of tolerance towards reproductive tourism and international reproductive markets rests on the following three arguments, which will each be discussed in this article.

1) The first assumption is that states cannot and should not interfere with actions undertaken by citizens abroad, as other jurisdictions are involved. Therefore, if one agrees that regulation of reproductive markets is required, an international legal approach seems indispensable for the regulation of transnational reproductive travel (section III).
2) However, according to the second argument, international legislation in this field is neither feasible nor desirable. European harmonisation of ART laws is not only practically impossible considering the wide variety of bioethical and religious traditions in countries across Europe, but would, according to some authors, also be potentially at odds with the respect for reproductive autonomy (section IV).
3) Therefore, if States want to act against reproductive travel, alternative strategies have to be considered; if the mountain will not come to Mohammed, Mohammed must go to the mountain. Instead of viewing the lack of regulation in the country of destination as the main cause for reproductive tourism, one could also regard the legal restrictions within the country of origins as the core of the problem. By adopting more lenient national policies towards ARTs, governments could remove the main incentive for aspiring parents to resort to foreign reproductive services. Such an approach would offer the best guarantees for an effective regulation of reproductive travel (section V).

These three arguments can be viewed as the strands of a broader argument for the pragmatic tolerance of both national and international reproductive markets; namely a tolerance based not so much on the legitimacy of these markets, but on the inevitability of these markets. Or in the words of Suter, a ‘tolerance not grounded in ‘ideal theory’ but practical realities’.​[14]​ 

Although this increasingly popular line of argument in politics and academia offers valuable insights into the regulation of reproductive markets, and is to a certain extent indispensable for policy makers in this field, several disadvantages and weaknesses tend to be overlooked. Especially within the scholarly literature on regulation of ‘cross-border reproductive care’, the pragmatic approach is seldom challenged. Moreover, this tendency seems important to point out and analyse, since most national legal systems in Europe, as said, have opted for a more-or-less strict regulation of reproductive markets. If the effect of the pragmatic approach will be that these national legal frameworks are gradually undermined - not so much as the result of democratic deliberation or new ethical directions in legislation, but more as an indirect consequence of certain mechanisms and dynamics - then it would seem at odds with the respect for the existing plurality of legal and ethical traditions in Europe.

Hereafter, two recent affairs will be discussed relating to cross-border surrogacy arrangements and egg cell tourism to illustrate the legal ambiguities surrounding reproductive tourism (II). This will be followed by a critical investigation of the three aforementioned arguments (III, IV and V). This investigation culminates in a plea for a more positive understanding and recognition of the symbolic dimensions of reproductive laws (VI). It will be argued that ART laws also have a fundamental meaning and function which surpass these laws’ practical effectiveness. Although much​[15]​ has been written on the rise of reproductive tourism, the symbolic dimensions of regulation in this area have been generally neglected so far. 


II. THE LEGAL AMBIGUITIES SURROUNDING REPRODUCTIVE TOURISM

In most European countries reproductive tourism has become a hotly debated issue in politics and law. The overall legal confusion on transnational reproductive travel has resulted in somewhat ambivalent and even contradictory legal-political positions and decisions, generally followed by heated public debate. In this section, these ambiguities will be illustrated through a series of recent events related to two of the most prevalent forms of circumventive reproductive tourism: cross-border surrogacy arrangements (IIa) and egg cell tourism (IIb). These examples will be referred to in the subsequent analysis of the three aforementioned strands of the pragmatic approach to reproductive markets.

IIa. Cross-Border Surrogacy Arrangements

In January 2013 political debates in France on cross-border surrogacy ‘sent thousands to the streets, turned the bridges over the Seine into billboards and prompted charges that women’s bodies will soon be for rent’ according to press reports.​[16]​ The source of this upheaval was a circular​[17]​ on surrogacy addressed to the judiciary from the Minister of Justice Christiane Taubira. Surrogacy in general is prohibited in France as it is regarded as a violation of the principle of ‘l’indisponibilité du corps humain’ (the principle that the human body is inalienable).​[18]​ Nevertheless, as in other European countries where surrogacy is legally restricted or banned,​[19]​ intending parents have evaded these restrictions by travelling abroad to hire the services of surrogate mothers in countries such as India, Ukraine and the United States of America. However, upon return to France with their newborns, or even prior to arrival, parents encounter problems when they request to have the foreign birth certificates recognised and included in the French civil register. According to the French Supreme Court, recognition of these certificates would violate fundamental principles of French law,​[20]​ as surrogacy contracts are void and contrary to French public order, irrespective of their possible validity abroad.​[21]​ As a result, these children cannot acquire French citizenship and are even at risk of becoming stateless.

In the aforementioned circular, Taubira instructed the judiciary to henceforth accept citizenship applications for children born abroad to a foreign surrogate, if at least one of the legal parents is a French citizen. Ms Taubira and President François Hollande insisted that the instruction would not bring about any legal changes as it is in line with the French Civil Code.​[22]​ Moreover, surrogacy, against which Hollande stated to remain ‘firmly opposed’,​[23]​  continues to be prohibited according to French law. The circular’s sole intended purpose was to prevent children born out of cross-border surrogacy arrangements becoming the stateless ‘ghosts of the Republic’, to use a much quoted phrase. Nevertheless, a majority of the French population disapproved of the circular and believed it to be the first step towards the legalisation of surrogacy.​[24]​ Additionally, the announcement practically led to a political crisis.​[25]​ 

However, it seems that the circular has in fact not brought about radical legal changes, and probably even less than Taubira had hoped for. The circular aims at realising French citizenship for children born out of cross-border surrogacy arrangements; it does not force French authorities to recognise the legal parenthood of the commissioning couple as stated in foreign birth certificates. Indeed, in a decision involving twins born from an Indian surrogate mother, which followed several months after Taubira’s circular, the French Supreme Court reconfirmed that the refusal to recognise foreign birth certificates is justified when that birth is the result of cross-border surrogacy arrangements.​[26]​  On the rights of the commissioning parents and interests of the resulting children, the Supreme Court ruled that 

in case of evasion of the law, neither the supreme interest of the child as guaranteed in Article 3 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, nor the right to private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, can be usefully invoked.​[27]​ 

In short, even if these children are to be recognised as French citizens according to Taubira’s circular, they will according to the Supreme Court not be legally recognised as the sons or daughters of the intending parents. As a result, the French legal policy on cross-border surrogacy has become contradictory, to say the least. 

Both the legal ambiguities surrounding Taubira’s circular and the ensuing heated political debates illustrate how the issue of access to international reproductive markets represents a political, moral and legal grey zone to national governments and legal officials. Moreover, the public commotion focused not just on the phenomenon of reproductive tourism itself, but more specifically on the role and effects of national law within the regulation of these matters. Is the French Government facilitating or even encouraging surrogacy tourism through its pragmatic approach? Is this policy based on double standards, given that surrogacy is prohibited in France? Additionally, from what point do cross-border surrogacy arrangements become a French affair? Do fundamental principles of French law apply when French intending parents travel abroad to commission a surrogate? Furthermore, how do these principles relate to human rights law, such as the children’s rights and the intending parents’ right to family life? 

The complexity of these questions is underlined by the fact that in other European countries alternative directions have been chosen on both a judicial and political level. To start with the judicial level, the case-law in this field is often marked by a specific type of pragmatic reasoning. Although recognition of the commissioning parents as legal parents may conflict with public order because of existing prohibitions on commercial surrogacy, judges have nevertheless seen themselves forced to do so in the interest of the newborn child. After all, at the time that the request is made, the birth of the child from a paid surrogate is a fait accompli. As a result, judges often follow the reasoning of the intending parents’ requests in order to protect the welfare of the child, even if they condemn the commercial transaction that preceded the child’s birth.​[28]​ 

On a political level, ‘la logique du fait accompli’​[29]​  in cases of cross-border surrogacy has taken on different forms.  A good example is the recent campaign on cross-border surrogacy, which the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) launched in February 2014. Through the campaign’s slogan (‘before considering surrogacy overseas, do your research’), the FCO seeks ‘to help inform prospective parents about what to expect right from the outset – so that they are prepared, get the right advice and they don’t run into unexpected difficulties’.​[30]​ Indeed, a closer look at the information leaflet for potential travellers confirms that the campaign is not so much aimed at raising awareness on the grounds for the UK’s existing ban on commercial surrogacy, such as its possible exploitative effects, but rather at providing assistance to UK residents when they decide to engage in surrogacy arrangements in foreign countries. If surrogacy tourism is bound to take place, the FCO seems to have reasoned, the tourists in question may as well begin their journeys well-informed. Nevertheless, the fact that the FCO fails to mention for instance the risks for the surrogate mothers involved, and solely focuses on possible bureaucratic obstacles for prospective parents, seems remarkable, especially given the fact that the campaign explicitly targets reproductive travellers to not only the United States, but also Georgia, Ukraine and India – countries where surrogate mothers are likely to be economically more vulnerable.​[31]​

Another approach propagated in both politics and academia as a pragmatic solution to the problems surrounding cross-border surrogacy arrangements, is ‘to reconsider restrictive domestic laws in countries where the potential harms are least likely to materialize’,​[32]​ which is the reproductive travellers’ country of departure in most cases. For instance, Horsey and Sheldon argue ‘that making surrogacy services more readily available in the UK would reduce the incidence of cross-border arrangements’.​[33]​ In similar vein, the Dutch Secretary of Justice and Security has recently proposed to henceforth accept Dutch citizens engaging in commercial surrogacy abroad, when these parents request to enter the Netherlands with their child. The only condition is that one of the intending parents is genetically related to the child. According to the Secretary of Justice and Security, for practical reasons no public order assessments may be made regarding the amount of money that was paid to the surrogate, and whether the surrogate mother was exploited.​[34]​ 

IIb. Egg Cell Tourism

In July 2013 the Dutch Government was confronted with parliamentary questions on ‘egg cell tourism’ from the Netherlands to Spain. Like many other European countries, the Netherlands is facing an increasing shortage​[35]​ of donated egg cells for both reproductive and scientific purposes.​[36]​ Few women appear to be willing to donate ova, as this involves an extensive hormone treatment and a surgical procedure, both of which are emotionally and physically demanding. Spanish clinics, on the contrary, have been able to attract numerous, young​[37]​ donors, especially among the student population, thanks to relatively generous and long-standing ‘compensation’ schemes for donors. The numbers of donors have increased even more ever since the financial crisis hit Spain.​[38]​ Remarkably, waiting lists have now come into existence, not for intending parents, as in most European countries, but for potential egg cell donors.​[39]​ Recent news reports suggest that under the current economic circumstances, Spanish egg donation should no longer be called completely altruistic and voluntary, but in many cases rather the product of financial desperation.​[40]​

One of the side effects of these legal and economic disparities is that the Netherlands is currently targeted by Spanish fertility clinics as a new market for egg cell treatments. The aforementioned parliamentary questions focused on an Alicante based IVF clinic, which has been organising information meetings for Dutch prospective parents on the possibilities of anonymous egg cell donation in Spain through its regional office in the Netherlands. These meetings led to public debate, primarily because anonymous gamete donation is prohibited in the Netherlands.​[41]​

In answer to parliamentary questions on the Spanish clinic’s activities in the Netherlands, Minister of Public Health Edith Schippers offered ambivalent answers. She stated that according to Dutch law it is not prohibited to have a regional office that only supplies information on certain fertility treatments abroad, regardless of how controversial that may be. Yet Schippers added that this does not mean that she supports the aims of the regional office, ‘as it promotes and supplies information on activities which are regulated differently or even prohibited within the Netherlands’.​[42]​ As to the fact that Dutch patient organisations are promoting the Spanish clinic’s activities, she did not see any immediate legal problems. However, she argued that Dutch gynaecologists should not collaborate in the clinic’s activities, both preceding and during the treatments. Schippers agreed with the Dutch College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists that collaboration would be against existing professional guidelines due to the origins of the egg cells. Lastly, the Minister announced that she was not prepared to raise this matter at a European level. In her opinion, bioethical matters are a strictly national affair, and should remain so. Yet it is clear that egg cell donation has been on the political​[43]​ and legal​[44]​ agenda of the EU. Additionally, in a growing number of European countries anonymous donation has been prohibited to protect the future children’s right to know their genetic parents.​[45]​

Within this Dutch case, questions arise as to jurisdiction on these matters. The Minister’s ambiguous answers show how difficult it is to draw clear-cut lines. Can the Dutch Government’s unease with reproductive tourism be translated into legal action? Does the current Dutch prohibition on anonymous gamete donation also cover different forms of assistance to clinics that offer that form of donation? And which aspects of this case of egg cell tourism are a national affair, Spanish affair or European affair?

Whereas these parliamentary questions focused on the anonymity of foreign egg cell donors, other recent political debates have revolved around the question of compensation for egg cell donation. Remarkably, at a time of financial crisis, in which the potentially exploitative side effects of the Spanish compensation scheme are coming to the surface, some countries are starting to adopt the Spanish egg cell policy. The past few years have seen a rise in new donation policies and compensation schemes in several European countries, aimed at increasing the number of donated gametes. For example, since April 2012 British egg donors will no longer receive £250, but instead £750 for each cycle of egg donation.​[46]​ That same month the first Dutch human egg cell bank opened its doors in Utrecht, where egg donors will receive €1000 for their efforts.​[47]​ These initiatives were defended with mainly utilitarian and pragmatic arguments, relating to the current shortage of egg donors and the concomitant rise of reproductive tourism.​[48]​


III. WHOSE BUSINESS IS REPRODUCTIVE TOURISM ANYWAY?

In this section, the first pillar of the emerging strategy of tolerance towards reproductive tourism and international reproductive markets will be examined: the thought that domestic reproductive laws do not and should not apply to citizens’ participation in foreign reproductive markets. As illustrated in the previous section, the political debates on egg cell tourism and cross-border surrogacy bring to light a certain helplessness of national governments in these matters. On the one hand, politicians express profound objections against their citizens’ participation in foreign reproductive markets. On the other, they declare that no legal action will or can be undertaken against these transactions because they took place abroad. This common political response to reproductive tourism seems to rest on two presumptions: firstly, that legal actions against reproductive tourism necessarily amount to extraterritorial interventions, and secondly, that this extraterritorial scope is legally problematic. Both presumptions are not self-evident. 

As to the first presumption, both the examples of cross-border surrogacy and egg cell tourism illustrate the blurred lines between jurisdictions in these matters. In many cases it is not immediately clear when extraterritoriality is involved in the first place. Even if it is true that participation in foreign reproductive markets cannot be prohibited because of issues related to extraterritoriality, national governments face a number of regulatory dilemmas when reproductive travellers subsequently return to their home countries and make certain requests. Local authorities may be requested to legally recognise the new familial situation of the returning reproductive travellers and their newborns (as in the French surrogacy affair), or physicians may be approached for further medical treatment​[49]​ in the context of a pregnancy that commenced abroad (as in the Dutch cases of egg cell tourism to Spain). Moreover, it remains unclear whether physicians, fertility brokers and patient organisations are allowed to refer patients to foreign clinics in which prohibited reproductive services are offered. Finally, can insurance companies reimburse the costs of such legally contested treatments? As a result of the widely diverging reactions from national authorities and professional groups to these issues, the question remains to what extent third parties can facilitate reproductive travellers in their evasion of domestic laws. 

The second presumption of the common political response to reproductive tourism raises the question whether states have the legal authority to apply their reproductive laws extraterritorially. According to international law, the answer is unequivocally yes. Under the widely recognised nationality principle, nations have the authority to regulate actions of their citizens anywhere in the world. From this perspective it is not necessarily problematic if a state applies its national reproductive laws to foreign reproductive markets, as long as the reproductive tourist in question is a national. Correspondingly, some nations​[50]​ have adopted legislation that prohibits certain forms of reproductive tourism. 

Nevertheless, these examples are not likely to be followed by EU Member States. Prohibiting citizens to travel abroad for reproductive services seems to be not only practically unfeasible and potentially highly intrusive,​[51]​ but also at odds with the freedom to provide and receive services, as guaranteed within the EU.​[52]​ Moreover, in many countries the principle of ‘double criminality’ applies, according to which national legal prohibitions can only be enforced if these also apply in the country where the incriminating behaviour took place. It is clear that this is mostly not the case for reproductive tourism, since the main reason why many people travel to these countries in the first place, is the absence of legal restrictions. 

However, there are matters in which extraterritorial laws are generally thought to be acceptable. In fact, in many countries the requirement of double criminality does not apply to several categories of crimes, such as sex with children, female genital mutilation and human trafficking. The question, therefore, arises whether certain acts of reproductive tourism can or should be included in this group of crimes. The Dutch Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings recently answered this question in the affirmative, when she stated that ‘commercial surrogacy, under certain circumstances, could constitute human trafficking’.​[53]​ Similarly, the most outspoken critics of reproductive tourism refer to it as ‘reproductive trafficking’.​[54]​ Others, however, consider extraterritorialiality in this area inappropriate.​[55]​ Belgian ethicists Van Hoof and Pennings offer two arguments against extraterritorial reproductive laws. 

Firstly, Van Hoof and Pennings doubt whether extraterritorial prohibitions in this area are appropriate, when possible abuses and harms can be prevented through other means than a legal ban on these reproductive treatments. For instance, commercial surrogacy in India can in their view cease to be exploitative when a high enough amount of money is paid to the surrogate, based on a fair share of the profit with the surrogacy agency.​[56]​ With Humbyrd, they consider a system of ‘fair trade international surrogacy’, modelled after fair trade coffee and bananas, a real possibility.​[57]​ Besides the possible ethical shortcomings of this line of reasoning,​[58]​ these arguments are not convincing from a legal perspective. The fair trade approach to combating exploitation does not correspond with the legal understanding of exploitation within the regulation of surrogacy. Laws against commercial surrogacy are aimed at preventing for profit surrogacy and its accompanying risks of economic coercion of the surrogate mother involved, rather than at realising a fair distribution of the profits raised by the surrogacy industry. Correspondingly, proportionality tests used by British courts in surrogacy cases are directed at answering the question whether the payments were disproportionate to reasonable expenses (or ‘were of such a level to overbear the will of the surrogate’),​[59]​ rather than whether payments were proportionate to the profit made by the surrogacy agency. 

Van Hoof and Pennings’ second, more implicit argument is that undisputable moral wrongs can ‘only be defined in legal terms by referring to human rights’.​[60]​ They argue that the supposed rights on which the legal bans on certain reproductive treatments are based, are too morally ambiguous to justify a human rights label.​[61]​ In their opinion, in the field of reproductive treatments only reproductive cloning is universally recognised as a violation of fundamental rights.​[62]​ However, this argument would also appear legally problematic. More can and should be said about the relationship between human rights and the limits to reproductive markets. The most important human rights instruments in this field indicate that human rights amount to more in the context of reproductive market regulation than solely the protection of reproductive autonomy, freedom of contract and informed consent. Human rights have been invoked in the contexts of both the Council of Europe and the EU to justify various limits to reproductive markets. For example, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine includes prohibitions on germline genetic modification (Article 13) and choosing a child's sex (Article 14), regardless of the fact whether informed consent was obtained. 

Additionally, the principle of non-commercialisation is not only recognised in several important human rights documents, such as Article 21 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and Article 3 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, but is also often applied to justify certain limits to commercial surrogacy and egg cell trade.​[63]​ The connection between these limits to the commercialisation of human reproduction on the one hand, and human rights on the other, is explained in the Convention’s Explanatory Report on Article 21 by reference to the founding principle of human rights: human dignity.​[64]​ Both prevailing interpretations of human dignity – dignity as empowerment and dignity as constraint​[65]​ – seem relevant at this point. The nature of reproductive markets may compromise free deliberation through economic coercion (empowerment), and can bring about a commodification of human life (constraint). 

In short, there is a case to be made that extraterritorial jurisdiction in some cases of reproductive tourism can be justified from a human rights perspective. In the next section the role of human rights law in current European regulation of reproductive markets will be further analysed. 


IV. THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND REPRODUCTIVE TOURISM

IVa. The failure of current European limits to reproductive markets

Even though it has been argued in the previous section that under certain circumstances, reproductive tourism can be made the business of national governments, it is also clear that an international approach would be more suited to this essentially transnational issue. The possibilities to effectively regulate reproductive tourism through national legislation remain limited. Interestingly, European legal guidelines for both surrogacy​[66]​ and egg cell donation​[67]​ are slowly emerging. However, so far these developments have not led to effective norms of hard law. 

Firstly, international instruments such as the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and its protocols have been ratified in relatively few countries, and do not have effective mechanisms​[68]​ in place to oversee the enforcement of their provisions. Secondly, even when the prohibitions are laid down in hard law instruments, such as EU regulations and directives, the question remains whether they will have meaningful effects, since their formulation often leaves ample room for interpretation. A telling example is the way in which the principle of non-commercialisation has been mobilised in EU law. Article 12 of the EU Tissue Directive, which also applies to human gametes,​[69]​ offers a good illustration:

Member States shall endeavour to ensure voluntary and unpaid donations of tissues and cells. Donors may receive compensation, which is strictly limited to making good the expenses and inconveniences related to the donation. In that case, Member States define the conditions under which compensation may be granted.

The direct legal relevance of this Article remains limited because the only requirement made is an endeavour from the Member States. More importantly, according to the last sentence it is effectively up to Member States to determine where the lines between improper financial incentives to human tissue donation and fair financial compensation are drawn. This explains how some European countries can be far more accommodating to the commercial dimensions of reproductive markets than others, despite the European recognition of the principle of non-commercialisation.​[70]​

As a consequence, the call for further and more substantial international regulation of reproductive markets is heard from time to time. However, according to the second strand of the plea for a pragmatic tolerance of reproductive tourism and reproductive markets, international harmonisation of reproductive laws is undesirable given the existing plurality of ethical and religious traditions both on a national and European level. After a critical examination of the main arguments offered for this position (IVb), the emerging case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on questions related to assisted reproduction will be discussed (IVc). Surprisingly, the pragmatic argument seems to be gaining popularity in Strasbourg too, albeit with different effect.

IVb. The pragmatic case against a European harmonisation of reproductive laws

One does not need to be a eurosceptic to doubt whether European harmonisation of laws in a field as controversial as assisted reproduction is a feasible ideal. Europe’s wide variety of legal and moral traditions has resulted in radical differences in ART regulation, ranging from laissez-faire to prohibitive approaches, which currently seem impossible to reconcile. Nevertheless, even if harmonisation would become an attainable goal, it should, according to Pennings, not be pursued. In his view, reproductive tourism is not only a necessary side effect of state sovereignty in the regulation of these questions, but even a phenomenon that should be embraced and, therefore, should not be combated through legal harmonisation.

His first argument is that reproductive tourism offers a ‘pragmatic solution’​[71]​ to the problem of reconciling the majority’s opinions of ARTs with the desires of the members of certain minority groups, who wish to benefit from these technologies.​[72]​ Secondly, he argues that allowing reproductive tourism is an expression of respect for both the existing moral pluralism among European states and the individual’s reproductive autonomy.​[73]​ In Pennings’ view, reproductive tourism functions as a ‘safety valve that avoids moral conflict, and as such, contributes to a peaceful coexistence of different ethical and religious views in Europe’.​[74]​ Correspondingly, he considers the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine as ‘an indirect attempt to reduce diversity’.​[75]​ A closer look reveals that this line of reasoning obscures crucial dimensions of the practice of reproductive tourism. 

Pennings presents his approach as a compromise which leaves the existing restrictions on the use of ARTs intact at the national level as an expression of the majority’s will, while allowing members of ‘reproductive minority’ groups to act according to their personal moral views by going abroad. As a result, social peace is maintained and ‘frustration and indignation of the minority group’​[76]​ are prevented. Within this approach, the main legal-ethical dilemma of reproductive tourism is framed as a moral clash of values between a conservative majority and a progressive minority. This frame can also be recognised elsewhere within the academic literature on the subject. Blyth and Farrand, for example, state that 

central to the debate on reproductive tourism is the question of the appropriate balance to be struck in a democratic society between the moral views of the majority and individual human rights and freedoms.​[77]​ 

From this perspective, it indeed seems strange that ‘pure majoritarian will succeeds in suffocating other, though perhaps less popular, sentiments on family life’, as Storrow writes.​[78]​ Evidently, in a liberal democratic society in which the rule of law applies, the constitutional rights of minorities are to be taken into account, even if a majority of the electorate thinks otherwise. 

However, this account offers an incomplete depiction of all the parties involved in reproductive tourism. What is left out are the rights and safety of third parties that may be compromised on the global reproductive market, such as women who may see themselves forced by economic circumstances to sell their ova and reproductive services,​[79]​ or the children resulting from these technologies. From a liberal perspective these women’s right to physical integrity and these children’s right to know their parents (Article 7 Convention on the Rights of the Child) should be equally taken into account as the right to procreation of aspiring parents. 

Admittedly, the exact scope and meaning of all these fundamental rights need to be elaborated within the context of ARTs. For instance, it remains legally contested how the right to procreation relates to commercial surrogacy or how the use of anonymous egg cell donation should be balanced against the children’s right to know their parents.​[80]​ Additionally, in some legal orders restrictions of access to ARTs may indeed be grounded on the views of a religious majority, such as on Christian views on the status of embryos. Nevertheless, it is clear that the main tension within the core questions surrounding the regulation of reproductive tourism is not so much between the conservative morality of the majority and the fundamental rights of a progressive minority, but between the rights and interests of the consumers of reproductive markets, on the one hand, and the providers of the raw materials and the children resulting from these transactions, on the other. 

When the interests of these third parties are represented within legal-ethical accounts of reproductive tourism, a different perspective surfaces in relation to Pennings’ pragmatic vision of reproductive tourism as ‘safety valve’. Even if reproductive tourism would be able to bring about ‘social peace’, the question is whether this social peace is not bought about at the cost of the rights of vulnerable third parties. Moreover, one can wonder whether reproductive tourism truly is a sign of respect for the plurality of existing moral and religious traditions within Europe, as Pennings maintains. Reproductive tourism is likely to set into motion a legislative race to the bottom, with national legislation gravitating towards the most permissive policies existing within Europe.​[81]​

IVc. The European Court of Human Rights on ARTs and reproductive tourism

The discussion in the previous subsection raises questions on the status of reproductive tourism and reproductive rights under European human rights law. Even though effective European legislation in the field of ARTs has so far remained underdeveloped, this has not prevented existing European frameworks, such as the European Convention of Human Rights, from being applied to matters related to assisted reproduction. Within the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Article 8, which guarantees everyone the right to respect for his private and family life, has taken on an especially significant meaning for matters of procreation.​[82]​ 

Over the course of the past few years, the scope of Article 8 for procreation has gradually been extended from a negative right to procreate without interference from third parties, to a positive right to access ARTs. Whereas the Court derived the right to become genetic parents from Article 8 in Dickson v the UK,​[83]​ and the right to respect for the decisions both to have and not to have a child in Evans v UK,​[84]​ it considered a few years later in S.H. and others v Austria ‘that the right to conceive a child and to make use of medically assisted procreation for that purpose is also protected by Article 8’.​[85]​ Most recently, the Court found in Costa and Pavan v Italy that a parents’ ‘desire to conceive a child unaffected by the genetic disease of which they are healthy carriers and to use ART and PGD to this end attracts the protection of Article 8’.​[86]​

Although these developments may seem to imply that restrictive policies on ARTs are increasingly found to be incompatible with Article 8, the Court’s progressive interpretation has until now not often led to the conclusion that Article 8 was actually breached. The reason is that in most of these cases the Court deemed the interference with Article 8 ‘necessary in a democratic society’. During this part of its judgment the Court confines itself as far as possible to a case-by-case approach. Applied to ARTs, this means that ‘the Court’s task is not to substitute itself for the competent national authorities in determining the most appropriate policy for regulating matters of artificial procreation’.​[87]​ More importantly, the Court will leave Member States a certain margin of appreciation in their evaluation of democratic necessity. Since Evans it is clear that there are mainly two factors which lead to a wide margin of appreciation for states in matters concerning ARTs: these technologies touch upon sensitive moral and ethical issues against a background of fast-moving medical-technological developments; and there is often not yet a clear common ground among Member States on the questions that ARTs raise.​[88]​ In other words, the Court to a certain extent considers its hands tied in matters concerning ARTs, with the result that existing differences in ART regulation among Member States are left intact. From this perspective, an indirect effect of the wide margin of appreciation will be an increase in reproductive tourism. 

Indirect or not, the Court’s restrictive approach to questions regarding assisted reproduction has provoked negative reactions. In dissenting opinions to both the Evans and S.H. case, the Court’s interpretation of the doctrine of margin of appreciation was criticised as simplistic, mechanical and overly pragmatic.​[89]​ More specifically, the dissenters stated that ‘in a case as sensitive as this one, the Court should not use the margin of appreciation principle as a merely pragmatic substitute for a thought-out approach to the problem of proper scope of review’.​[90]​

Recently, the Court has also explicitly addressed the question of reproductive tourism. Moreover, it has applied an openly pragmatic line of reasoning to this matter. Although the Court had already indirectly addressed the question of reproductive tourism in Gas and Dubois v France​[91]​ and even applied a similar logic in A, B and C v Ireland,​[92]​ it is the ruling in S.H. that has especially led to much controversy. The case involved the question whether the Austrian prohibitions on sperm donation for IVF purposes and ova donation in general are compatible with Article 8. The Austrian Government defended these prohibitions on the basis of three arguments: gamete donation for purposes of IVF may be used for eugenic selection of children which would violate human dignity; ova donation can lead to exploitation of women; and ova donation leads to an erosion of the principle of mater semper certa est.

Unsurprisingly, the Court concluded that the Austrian legislature, in justifying its prohibitions through these three arguments, did not exceed its broad margin of appreciation and consequently did not violate Article 8. What is surprising, however, is that the Court substantiates its judgment inter alia using an appeal to the possibilities of reproductive tourism. The Court observes, as proof of ‘the careful and cautious approach adopted by the Austrian legislature’,

that there is no prohibition under Austrian law on going abroad to seek treatment of infertility that uses artificial procreation techniques not allowed in Austria and that in the event of a successful treatment the Civil Code contains clear rules on paternity and maternity that respect the wishes of the parents.​[93]​

Within this approach, reproductive tourism is no longer merely an indirect effect of the Court’s doctrine of the margin of appreciation. Instead, the Court actively and directly relies on the practice of reproductive tourism to justify its conclusion that Austria’s interference with Article 8 can be regarded as necessary in a democratic society. 

According to this logic, the possibilities of reproductive tourism seem to be able to relieve Member States of certain obligations under the Convention. The Court’s line of reasoning seems all the more problematic in light of the Court’s endorsement of the three aforementioned arguments of the Austrian Government. As the dissenting judges point out, it is highly unlikely that concerns about human dignity, the well-being of future children or the exploitation of women will suddenly ‘disappear as a result of crossing the border’.​[94]​ The reference to reproductive tourism, therefore, seems to undermine an important part of the Court’s arguments.

The S.H. case illustrates that certain mechanisms and doctrines of European human rights law seem to stimulate or even facilitate cross-border reproductive transactions and arrangements. Nevertheless, in this case the Court uses its pragmatic approach to reproductive tourism as an argument for tolerance of national restrictive legislation on ARTs. In other contexts, however, the practice of reproductive tourism has been relied on to justify a pragmatic tolerance of reproductive markets. This brings us to the third and last strand of the argument in favour of a pragmatic tolerance of reproductive markets, which will be examined in the next two sections.


V. FROM ZERO TOLERANCE TO PRAGMATIC TOLERANCE OF BABY MARKETS

Va. Are national regulators wasting their time with reproductive laws?

It has become clear in the previous section that national governments mostly still have to find their own solutions to the problems and dilemmas surrounding reproductive travel. One of the possible solutions that seems to be gaining popularity lately, both in politics and academia, are national policy reforms based on a pragmatic tolerance of reproductive markets. An example is offered by the ethical guidelines on cross-border reproductive care from the Taskforce Ethics & Law of the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE). After having identified the most important ethical problems related to cross-border reproductive care (CBRC), the Taskforce concludes with the following three recommendations to national legislatures:

Provide at least partial reimbursement for treatment to ensure equitable access for all citizens; adopt a less restrictive legislation not to force large groups of patients to travel abroad; and extend the portability of health insurance (at least for treatment that is not prohibited in the home country) to reproductive health care.​[95]​ 

The message from the ESHRE seems to be that as soon as the legal obstacles to reproductive tourism are removed and reproductive travellers are facilitated in their ‘quests for conception’, the most important ethical problems associated with reproductive tourism will also disappear. Similarly, CBRC-lawyer Richard Storrow’s main solution to what he calls ‘the pluralism problem in cross-border reproductive care’​[96]​ is that ‘restrictive reproductive laws that contribute to cross-border reproductive travel should be more carefully scrutinized’.​[97]​ Pennings takes it one step further suggesting that reproductive tourism is not so much part of the problem, but rather a solution to the problem of restrictive ART legislation.​[98]​ In similar vein, the ESHRE stresses in other guidelines that CRBC is to be considered first and foremost as ‘a solution that enhances patient’s autonomy’.​[99]​

Implicit within this approach is a ‘different conception of law and regulation’​[100]​ to deal with the complexities raised by interstate travelling. Hereafter, the outlines of this new conception of law within the regulation of reproductive markets will be explored and critically analysed. The focus will be on the ESHRE’s second recommendation to national legislatures: to adopt less restrictive policies in the field of reproductive technologies and markets. According to this line of thought, the simplest and most effective way for governments to eliminate reproductive tourism, is to abolish, relax or not enforce the main incentive for aspiring parents to resort to reproductive travel: the existing restrictive or prohibitive laws on reproductive markets within the reproductive travellers’ country or origin. 

Section II offered several examples of this tendency: the relaxation of surrogacy laws and the adjustment of compensation schemes for egg cell donation to prevent reproductive tourism. Additionally, a certain degree of pragmatic tolerance may be read into efforts to regulate the situations in which a child is born abroad out of contested reproductive arrangements. According to this line of reasoning, reproductive travel has brought about ‘a breakdown in the legislative process’​[101]​ which makes a more pragmatic regulatory approach necessary. This breakdown is identified on roughly four levels within the scholarly literature on the subject. 

Firstly, regardless of whether legal restrictions to reproductive markets are morally justified, these restrictions have proven to be ineffective and might, according to this logic, just as well be discarded. As Brazier summarises this argument for the British situation: ‘If I can order sperm on the Internet, or hire a surrogate mother from Bolivia, are British regulators wasting their time’?​[102]​ 

On a second level, prohibitive reproductive laws are not only ineffective in light of reproductive tourism, but also appear to have several negative side effects. According to a well-known argument, criminalisation of reproductive markets ‘will [only] drive the practice underground and make exploitation and harm more – not less likely’.​[103]​ This line of reasoning is similar to the oft-heard arguments in favour of decriminalisation of other contested markets, such as those in soft drugs and prostitution. The novelty lies in the fact that the logic of pragmatic tolerance is now also applied to the regulation of bioethical matters, such as organ markets and reproductive markets. From this sceptical perspective, prohibitions on commercial surrogacy or selling egg cells will only serve to drive intending parents to either black or foreign reproductive markets, in which none of the domestic law’s safety and health guarantees for all those involved apply. Moreover, when the country of destination is relatively poor, concerns for exploitation of egg cell donors and surrogate mothers become pressing. Critics point out that in such cases, ‘the law seems to have an effect that is antithetical to its declared principles and objectives’.​[104]​

A third problem is that the enforcement of restrictive reproductive laws is often ‘highly impractical’.​[105]​  If the legal prohibition at stake is directed at the commercial nature of the reproductive service, as is the case with legal bans on commercial surrogacy or selling egg cells, it is difficult to prove that disproportionate sums of money have actually been paid. This is one of the main reasons why the Dutch Secretary of Justice suggested to refrain from interrogating returning reproductive travellers on the fees they have paid to their surrogates in countries such as India and Ukraine.

A fourth and final point of criticism from proponents of a pragmatic approach is that prohibitive reproductive laws do not provide sufficient rules and guidelines for the situations in which the prohibited action has nevertheless taken place. The resulting regulatory vacuum ‘may increase the vulnerability of the disempowered because we will have washed our hands of markets, effects and all’.​[106]​ More generally, criminalising behaviour becomes problematic when the outcome of that behaviour is the birth of a child. After all, ‘who could criminalize a product that turns out to be a child’?​[107]​ The confusion on the legal status of children born out of cross-border surrogacy arrangements serves as an illustration.

These arguments have lead authors​[108]​ to argue for a regulatory instead of a prohibitive approach to reproductive markets and reproductive tourism. Instead of holding on to existing legal bans and ethical imperatives, the realities and complexities of reproductive markets should according to them be acknowledged and addressed in law. As Krawiec clearly writes:

Commentators and policy makers have spent much time romanticizing or ignoring the baby market and fretting over an impending commercialization or commodification that, in fact, took place long ago. In today’s legal regime, rules prohibiting baby selling have little to do with grand normative statements about sacred values and, instead, accomplish little more than impeding market access by baby producers.​[109]​

The four levels of criticism reveal important shortcomings of a strictly prohibitive approach to reproductive markets. The inability of restrictive ART laws to effectively change the behaviour of reproductive tourists, as well as the negative side effects of such legal frameworks, are realities which national governments can ill afford to neglect. However, it would be too hasty to conclude that restrictive ART laws should therefore be completely rejected as being the legal triggers of reproductive travel, accomplishing ‘little more than impeding market access’. Some authors even suggest that restrictive ART laws are nothing more than ‘meaningless’​[110]​ showcases of ‘harmful hypocrisy’​[111]​  forcing prospective parents into ‘reproductive exile’.​[112]​ 

The legal realities and ethical debates surrounding reproductive travel are more complex and ambiguous than these one-dimensional portrayals suggest. Even if restrictive ART laws may sometimes fall short on a practical level, they nevertheless have an important and even constitutive meaning and function within the regulation of bioethical issues, which surpass these laws’ practical effectiveness. Alternatively, policies based on the pragmatic tolerance of reproductive markets show significant shortcomings, which also need to be taken into consideration by national governments when evaluating existing ART laws. Three premises of the pragmatic account of ART laws seem to be particularly problematic. 

The first problematic premise is that the main problem of reproductive tourism lies with the legislation within the reproductive tourist’s country of origin, and not the lack of legislation within the country of destination. To a certain extent, this reverse logic makes sense, since national governments can evidently only influence reproductive tourists’ behaviour from their side of the equation. Moreover, restrictive reproductive laws may have the effect of exporting the risks and dangers of reproductive markets to other, often poorer, countries.​[113]​ However, this logic has its limitations. One can wonder if adopting more lenient ART laws will not in turn result in the import of the risks and dangers of foreign reproductive markets, against which these laws were supposed to protect in the first place. 

Secondly, pragmatic strategies are often presented as offering a shortcut from the complex moral debates which usually precede the regulation of these sensitive issues. According to this line of reasoning, one would be able to evade taking a moral or political stance by choosing a pragmatic approach, thus transcending the existing lack of moral consensus on the legitimacy of reproductive markets. In the following sub-section (Vb) it will be argued that such moral neutrality is practically infeasible and is accompanied by its own negative side effects. 

Thirdly, pragmatic strategies presuppose a limited understanding of the role and effects of law within the regulation of bioethical matters, in which the symbolic effects of biomedical law are neglected. Instead, a balanced legal approach to reproductive markets and reproductive tourism will be defended which takes both pragmatic and symbolic accounts of law’s meaning and function into account. As the symbolic aspects have so far been generally overlooked in discussions on reproductive tourism, the final section will be devoted to further articulation and exploration of the symbolic functions of law within the regulation of reproductive markets (VI).  

Vb. Pragmatic tolerance as a shortcut from complex legal-ethical debates?

One of the appeals of a pragmatic regulation of reproductive markets, is that it appears to offer a way out of seemingly never-ending debates on a realm of controversial issues, such as the goals for which assisted reproductive technologies can be used, the novel family structures to which these technologies give rise, and the legal and moral limits of markets when it comes to human reproductive services and goods. Instead of struggling with complex and slippery concepts such as commodification, exploitation and human dignity, pragmatic regulators can be ‘attentive to real problems that must be dealt with given the presence of these markets’.​[114]​ As Cahn writes: ‘In some ways, commodification is besides the point because, even if [the market] would be banned, underground markets would develop’.​[115]​ Thus, it no longer seems necessary to explain what distinguishes human gametes from consumer goods, what the consequences may be of the infiltration of market mechanisms in the sphere of reproduction, or why shopping around the global reproductive market to assemble the perfect baby fills many people with a certain unease. After all, even if we would be able to reach national consensus on the regulation of these thorny moral issues, the outcome would according to the pragmatic line of argumentation be irrelevant beforehand in light of the possibilities for intending parents to access underground or foreign baby markets. As a result, the political attention shifts away from the legitimacy of reproductive laws to the effectiveness of the law, away from discussing the special status of human gametes and human reproduction in law and society to finding ways to effectuate the freedom of contract on the reproductive market.

Nevertheless, the obvious question is whether by adopting a purely pragmatic approach to the regulation of reproductive questions, one is not trying to remove the ethical and political dimensions from an issue that is ethical and political at heart. More specifically, the shortcut that pragmatic policies on reproductive laws seem to provide out of complex political and moral debates is also likely to be a shortcut from public reflection and moral awareness on the goals and meaning of reproductive technologies and markets. These debates are part of the democratic process of coming to terms with new reproductive methods. After all, ARTs and reproductive markets have repercussions not only for the contracting parties, but also for the resulting future children, and even society as a whole. In this vein Spar writes: ‘as science continues to expand our menu of reproductive options, it will be increasingly important to engage in some kind of political debate and to ensure that some consideration stretches beyond the desires of individual parents’. According to her this should lead to nationally established limits to reproductive markets. She admits that such an approach might in fact expand reproductive tourism, as the regulatory divide among states would increase. However, as she writes, ‘it would also bring such tourism into the open, subjecting novel [reproductive] procedures […] to the scrutiny of public debate’.​[116]​

An additional negative side effect of these pragmatic policies may be, as Millns has put it, ‘a slippery form of negative deregulation’.​[117]​ In order to keep potential fertility travellers within national borders where they can receive reproductive services that live up to national safety standards in healthcare, countries are importing the policies from the least restrictive countries, which they would otherwise not have adopted. The result is a de facto and imposed European uniformity which points in the direction of a laissez-faire approach to reproductive markets. As such, the pragmatic solution seems to lead to results that are at odds with the respect for the plurality of existing ethical and religious traditions among European nations, and can thus hardly be called morally neutral.

Besides its possible negative long-term consequences, one can question the feasibility of a purely pragmatic approach to the regulation of reproductive markets. Upon closer inspection, appeals to pragmatic arguments in discussions on reproductive laws often appear to be grounded in ideal theory after all. The pragmatic argument of the ineffectiveness or negative side effects of restrictive laws then serves as a guise for a libertarian laissez-faire approach to reproductive markets. In those cases, one has not truly been able to evade taking a position in the debate on the legitimacy of reproductive markets.
 
More importantly, most policy makers and scholars are not willing to extend the pragmatic approach to all existing legal restrictions. For instance, in his letter to the Dutch parliament on cross-border surrogacy arrangements,​[118]​ the Dutch Secretary of Security and Justice was only prepared to turn a blind eye to possible violations of the principle of non-commercialisation. When it came to the use of anonymous gametes in these cases, he drew a firm line based on the future children’s right to know their parents, even if this means that the child which results from cross-border surrogacy arrangements is not allowed to enter Dutch territory and may remain stateless. This raises the question why a pragmatic approach would be justified in case of commercial surrogacy, and not anonymous gamete donation. Similarly, in scholarly literature the pragmatic line of thinking is mostly applied to reproductive laws that aim to counter the commercial aspects of reproductive markets, and not to legal prohibitions on for instance gender selection or postmenopausal pregnancies. Most authors who defend a pragmatic approach to reproductive laws draw the line at some point. This means that the need for a legal-ethical debate on the moral limits of reproductive markets persists, and that the discussion is merely shifted to other aspects of international reproductive markets. The question then becomes how we can decide which aspects of reproductive markets should be subjected to restrictive reproductive laws, and which to regulation based on pragmatic tolerance. This question, however, cannot be answered through a merely pragmatic approach.

Sceptics of restrictive reproductive laws may be right that banning reproductive markets in their entirety is not a realistic option. However, decisions still need to be made on the question which of these markets’ aspects and dimensions are completely off-limits (e.g. the existing worldwide bans on cloning, baby selling), which can be allowed under certain circumstances (e.g. surrogacy and gamete donation are currently allowed in many countries if non-commercial in nature) and which can be accepted as normal market transactions (e.g. currently internet-based fertility services are mostly left unregulated).​[119]​ Therefore, even if regulation may be preferable over prohibitions in certain cases, a differentiated approach, with varying regulatory regimes and corresponding legal limits to commercialisation, seems both inevitable and necessary. 


VI THE SYMBOLIC FUNCTIONS OF LAW WITHIN THE REGULATION OF REPRODUCTIVE MARKETS

As mentioned in the previous section, Pennings and Storrow argue that the rise of reproductive tourism necessitates a different conception of law and regulation. Indeed, the aforementioned four pragmatic objections against restrictive ART laws seem to share a certain vision of law, according to which the law’s quality can be measured through its practical effects (or their absence) on the concrete actions of the members of the legal order. Within this line of thinking, other effects of law, which do not manifest themselves through direct and visible changes in behaviour, are deemed of no or little importance. In this vein, when criticising restrictive ART laws for their inability to effectuate the desired behaviour, advocates of a pragmatic approach often designate these laws as ‘merely symbolic’.​[120]​ Evidently, within this context the adjective symbolic is primarily used as a negative designation, provoking negative associations with the phenomenon of symbolic legislation. 

In this section a positive account of the symbolic effects and functions of law will be developed.​[121]​ It will be argued that this neglect of the symbolic effects of law, which seems to underlie current appeals to a pragmatic tolerance of reproductive markets, goes back to a limited understanding of the function and meaning of law in ART regulation. Further analysis of the symbolic effects of ART laws can contribute to a more careful and balanced approach to the regulatory dilemmas surrounding reproductive tourism. 

Although the term symbolic is used in connection with the law in various fields of legal theory, varying from legislative theory​[122]​ and the law and literature movement to debates on the so-called anthropological function of law,​[123]​ some commonalities can be discerned. Recognition of the symbolic dimensions of law starts with the basic thought that the effects of law are often more complex and less tangible than can be perceived from citizens’ actual actions. One of the ways in which the law influences reality could be called symbolic. In this article the word ‘symbolic’ is used as a notion which stretches beyond the phenomenon of symbolic legislation, and refers to the thought that ‘law is part of a distinctive manner of imagining the real’, as anthropologist Clifford Geertz once formulated it.​[124]​ This phrase captures the idea that the law is not just a collection of commands backed up by coercion, but that it also tells a certain story, that it provides us with a vocabulary to symbolise and interpret (new) phenomena, that it is marked by certain cultural and anthropological dimensions and that it may ultimately affect our experience of the world around us. Hereafter, three symbolic functions of law will be addressed: law’s expressive, communicative and anthropological function, which each cover different parts of the regulation of reproductive markets.

The first symbolic function of law is its so-called expressive function, that is, ‘the function of law in ‘making statements’ as opposed to controlling behavior directly.’​[125]​ Especially when dealing with questions that touch upon the foundations of the legal order or the identity of the political and legal community, lawmakers will use the law to express the fundamental values at stake or to announce the legal order’s main aspirations. This is often the case within the regulation of bioethical or technological questions, such as new reproductive technologies. It could be said that legislation on such issues ‘usually […] tells us something about ourselves, about us as a society and about us as members of that society’.​[126]​ For instance, laws on the use of human embryos or human body parts reflect the ways in which a society looks upon the value of respect for human life or the status of the human body. From this perspective, bioethical laws function as a symbolisation and anchorpoint of the legal order’s collective self-image in these complex debates. Similarly, it is generally believed that biomedical developments may ultimately have repercussions for the protection of foundational values, such as human dignity and physical integrity. 

This dimension is reflected by the growing body of international human rights conventions and declarations related to biomedicine, such as the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. These international legal documents offer striking examples of law’s expressive function through their general statements and provisions, which express for instance ‘the primacy of the human being over the sole interest of society or science’, or the view that ‘the human body and its parts shall not give rise to financial gain’. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (UNESCO) even openly refers to its symbolic aspirations when it states that the human genome is in a symbolic sense the heritage of humanity.

One of the practical values of these admittedly abstract and vague statements in biomedical laws is that they set the stage for further public debate and political deliberation. This brings into focus the second symbolic function of legislation in this area: the communicative function. The communicative aspect covers the ways in which the law influences ‘the vocabulary by which people order their world, give meaning and attach value to it’​[127]​ as Van Klink writes, providing us with concepts, categories, values and principles to structure normative discussions. Unlike pragmatic approaches to law, which, as decribed in the previous section, aspire to offer an escape from complex ethical debates, the communicative perspective emphasises the ways in which law’s normative concepts and categories can facilitate and structure public debate. Moreover, under the communicative approach it becomes clear how the law’s normative framework and vocabulary may also leave their marks on moral and social experiences. Through its collective symbolisation of values, identities, phenomena and developments, the legal system can be regarded, as French legal scholar Edelman does, as ‘the most prodigious laboratory of the collective imaginary’.​[128]​

The communicative function of law becomes of special importance in cases in which the foundational categories of our traditional vocabularies appear to be falling short, such as in public debates on biomedical and reproductive technologies. The novel, hybrid entities of human origin which these technologies produce, such as embryonic stem cells, vitrified egg cells, and tissue engineered heart valves, defy the existing foundational distinctions between person and thing, the artificial and the natural, body and machine, and life and death. In other words, these technologies touch upon the existing symbolic order.​[129]​ The result is, as Habermas formulates it, ‘a dedifferentiation, through biotechnology, of deep-rooted categorical distinctions which we have as yet, in the description we give of ourselves, assumed to be invariant’.​[130]​ Moreover, the rapid pace at which these developments take place, poses an extra challenge for the existing symbolic order. As Squier wittingly writes: ‘Over our morning coffee we can discover how the foundational categories of human life have become subject to sweeping renegotiation under the impact of contemporary biomedicine and biotechnology’.​[131]​ Under these circumstances, the law’s language can become influential and even decisive in the formation of social-cultural imaginaries to come to an understanding of these novel human hybrid entities.

The third and last symbolic function of law that is relevant to the regulation of reproductive markets is law’s anthropological function, as it is has been called by a group of French legal scholars.​[132]​ Since the first civilisations, the most important biological facts of human life, such as birth, death, sexuality and kinship, have been surrounded by certain cultural and symbolical values and rituals. These values and rituals have, to a certain extent, also found their way into law, especially family law. In a way, ‘much of family law is no more – and no less – than the symbolic expression of certain cultural ideas’.​[133]​ Examples are the legal arrangements underlying marriage, kinship and parenthood. In these settings, the law can be said to fulfil a constitutive, anthropological function, contributing to the symbolisation of the bare, biological facts of life into meaningful events that can be integrated into our biographies. In this process, the law is not so much directly influencing citizens’ behaviour, but rather offering anthropological and institutional narratives which permeate the stories we tell about ourselves and each other. A primary example is the way in which the law recognises each and everyone upon birth as a legal subject with a name, role and place in a larger family story. Similarly, the legal contract of marriage offers those in an intimate relationship an institutional setting in which their mutual rights and obligations can take shape. As Supiot writes in his book Homo Juridicus, which is dedicated to the anthropological function of law: 

A legal system does not fulfil its anthropological function unless it guarantees that every newcomer on this earth finds a world that pre-exists them and guarantees their identity over time, while also providing them the opportunity to transform this world and leave their personal mark on it.​[134]​

Nevertheless, it is clear that existing legal-anthropological categories and narratives may change over time or become contested as a result of cultural, social or technological developments. The opening up of marriage for same sex couples in a growing number of countries offers a recent illustration. Another example, more related to reproductive markets and technologies, is the discussion on the legal-symbolic representation of filiation and parenthood. Should not both the intending and genetic parents be able to be legally recognised as legal parents, in order to do justice to the different types of family ties to the child? In fact, in several states the possibility of three or four legal parents is currently discussed, or has recently become a legal reality.​[135]​ 

However, some authors wish to take it one step further and abolish the role of family law in this area altogether. Under the system of intent-based parenthood which they propose, filiation would be the result of private contracts and negotiations rather than a status attributed by family law. According to them, this would correspond with the freedom of contract which reigns reproductive markets.​[136]​ What these proposals amount to is not just a critique of existing provisions of family law, but in the end a negation of the anthropological function of law itself.

The expressive, communicative and anthropological functions of law are each of special importance to the regulation of ARTs and reproductive markets. It is clear that these technologies and markets question the status and meaning which pregnancy, human gametes and kinship have traditionally had in culture and society. Correspondingly, an important part of the debate on the regulation of global reproductive markets is concerned with the transformation of pregnancy into a commercial service, of human gametes into biocapital, and of kinship into a relation between contracting parties. How should we understand and value the products and services which new reproductive technologies are creating? And to what extent should the changing attitudes towards human reproduction be reflected in law? 

These concerns on the commodification of human reproduction can be recognised in existing reproductive laws. The non-commercialisation approach to reproductive issues implies a symbolisation of reproductive goods and services as a gift rather than a tradable commodity, establishing bonds between giver and receiver.​[137]​ Legal prohibitions on the use of ARTs for sex selection, reproductive cloning or human germline genetic modification seem to be partially based on the thought that children are more than made-to-order products or objects designed to fulfil the needs of others. More generally, the law has traditionally attributed a special status to the human body and its elements exceeding that of an ordinary legal object. As a result of this legal symbolisation, in both common and civil law systems, property and contract approaches apply to the human body only to a limited degree, if at all.​[138]​ This brings us back to the expressive, communicative and anthropological functions of law. In offering certain representations of human reproduction, gametes, children and embryos, reproductive laws have an important function in the social-cultural symbolisation of new reproductive technologies, their hybrid products of human origin and the new relationships to which they give rise. It is exactly this vital dimension of ART laws that is neglected by proponents of a pragmatic approach to the regulation of reproductive markets.

The symbolic perspective reveals several shortcomings of a pragmatic approach to reproductive markets. Interestingly, policies based on a pragmatic tolerance of reproductive markets have certain symbolic effects themselves, which need to be addressed equally. Ironically, the pragmatic neglect of the symbolic effects of reproductive laws can in the long run also result in a disruption of the practical effects of these laws. The reason is that, even if governments do not aim to promote or license reproductive tourism by adopting pragmatic strategies, it may be perceived that way after all. An example is that a majority of the French people interpreted Taubira’s circular as opening the doors to commercial surrogacy. Similarly, Dutch potential reproductive tourists may feel encouraged or justified by Teeven’s proposals to participate in possibly exploitative practices of surrogacy in poorer countries. From this perspective, pragmatic policies can be said to send out a double signal, thereby also undermining the practical effectiveness of (the remaining) restrictive reproductive legislation.






Currently, existing legal limits to reproductive markets in Europe are making place for a laissez-faire approach. The abandonment of the existing, restrictive legal framework is not so much the direct result of a deliberate process of democratic decision-making, or of a positive appeal to certain moral values and ideals, but has been presented by policy makers, legal officials and scholars alike as the inevitable consequence of the rise of reproductive tourism. This tendency can be recognised on both a national and European level.

As reproductive tourism has revealed a certain powerlessness of national legislatures to regulate reproductive markets, an increasingly common strategy is to give up on legal prohibitions and restrictions, and give in to baby markets through pragmatic policies. The pragmatic outlook has left its marks on legal-political and academic responses to reproductive tourism on three levels, which have been critically examined in this article.

Firstly, it is generally assumed that states cannot and should not interfere with citizens’ participation in foreign reproductive markets, as other jurisdictions are involved. Yet the practice of reproductive tourism shows blurred lines between jurisdictions in these matters. Moreover, there is a case to be made that extraterritoriality is justified in certain cases of reproductive tourism that result in grave human rights violations. This line of reasoning is supported by the fact that the most important European legal restrictions of reproductive markets, such as the principle of non-commercialisation and the ban on sex selection, are rooted in human rights discourse.

However, according to the second line of pragmatic reasoning, European human rights law is doomed to fail in the regulation of reproductive markets, given the deeply rooted lack of consensus among European states on these bioethical matters. This impression has been confirmed in case-law of the ECtHR on artificial procreation. The absence of a common ground among Member States has led the ECtHR to allow Member States a broad margin of appreciation in matters related to ARTs. It can be argued that the resulting variety of national reproductive laws serves to stimulate reproductive tourism only further. Lately, the Court seems to have embraced an even more pragmatic attitude towards reproductive tourism: if reproductive tourism cannot be stopped, it might as well be accepted as a given fact, and actively used as an argument to relieve Member States of certain obligations under the Convention. 

Thirdly, also on a national level a tendency towards pragmatic tolerance of reproductive markets can be recognised. The main argument for this pragmatic approach is that legal restrictions have become ineffective and therefore merely symbolic as a consequence of reproductive tourism. According to this logic, it would be better to relax or eliminate current legal prohibitions and restrictions on ARTs and reproductive markets, and instead focus on the regulation of reproductive tourism and markets as given facts.  

As the proponents of this approach argue, the pragmatic angle presupposes a specific conception of law and its regulatory functions: what solely matters are the practical effects of the law on citizens’ actual behaviour. In the last part of this article it has been argued that this line of reasoning goes back to a limited understanding of the functions of law in the regulation of reproductive matters. More specifically, law’s symbolic functions are neglected. These symbolic functions are especially relevant in the context of ARTs. In offering certain representations of human reproduction, gametes, children and embryos, reproductive laws have an important function in the social-cultural symbolisation of new reproductive technologies and their hybrid products of human origin. However, the symbolic dimension of law needs to be actively cultivated. Existing legal frameworks and vocabularies, which take informed consent, freedom of contract and reproductive choice as a starting point, are not able to bring to legal expression the evolving social-cultural values and representations with which human reproduction, family relations and ARTs are surrounded.

This article has argued for a more critical evaluation of current pragmatic policies in the field of ART regulation, and a more positive understanding of the symbolic effects of reproductive laws. Nevertheless, it is clear that pragmatic considerations on reproductive tourism also have a certain role to play within the regulation of these multi-layered issues. Moreover, both the pragmatic and the symbolic perspective are characterised by shortcomings and benefits. Instead, what is needed is a careful and well-balanced approach, in which both the pragmatic and symbolic dimensions of these regulatory dilemmas are accounted for. For instance, judges confronted with cross-border surrogacy arrangements, will have to take into account both the fait accompli of the birth of a child (a pragmatic aspect), and the protection afforded by law against the commodification of mothers, children and pregnancies (a symbolic aspect). The Dutch Secretary of Security and Justice’s proposal to henceforth not question returning parents on their involvement in cross-border surrogacy arrangements at all, both concerning the amount they paid the surrogate mother or her social-economic circumstances, is an example of an overly pragmatic approach in which the symbolic effects of law are completely neglected.
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